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Abstract: Non-formal education programs are under increasing pressure to be
“evidence-based,” where evidence derived from randomized controlled trials is
seen as the most credible type of evidence—the “gold standard.” This qualitative
study explores the politics of evidence enacted in the practices of the “evidencebased” education movement, focusing on three cases.
Educational programs should be based on evidence. On its face, this statement seems
obvious and platitudinous. All non-formal education—like all human action—is based on some
evidence, in the vernacular sense of the term. Educators, administrators, program planners,
scholars and other people engaged in non-formal education base their actions on a wide array of
evidentiary information. What’s more, people engaged in non-formal and community-based
education tend to not be entirely unreflective about what informs their practice—the 2000 edition
of the Handbook of Adult and Continuing Education is centered on questions of critically
reflexive practice, highlighting the multiplicity of frameworks, theories of action, and ways of
knowing that guide professional non-formal educational praxis (Wilson & Hayes, 2000).
However, the “evidence-based” education movement—one of many related attempts to
“bridge the research-practice gap” that has gained prevalence in recent decades—is predicated on
more formal and conscribed definitions of evidence, where certain research and evaluation
approaches are valued more highly than others. In the current “era of accountability,” some
policy-makers, funding agencies, and scholars position “scientific” evidence derived from
randomized controlled trials (RCTs) as the “gold standard” for establishing proof of which
programs “work” and which do not (Coalition for Evidence-Based Policy, 2003; Mosteller &
Boruch, 2002; U.S. Department of Education, 2003). According to Trochim:
The gold standard debate is one of the most important controversies in contemporary
evaluation and applied social sciences. It’s at the heart of how we go about trying to
understand the world around us. It is integrally related to what we think science is and
how it relates to practice. There is a lot at stake. (Unpublished speech transcript,
September 10, 2007)
In his critique of the RCT design—in which he concludes that the RCT has “essentially zero
practical application to the field of human affairs” (2008, p. 12)—Scriven reiterates the point that
much is at stake, claiming, “This issue is not a mere academic dispute, and should be treated as
one involving the welfare of very many people, not just the egos of a few” (2008, p. 24). In this
study, I leverage both empirical and theoretical perspectives on the “evidence-based” movement
to provide examples of the ways in which tightly circumscribed definitions of “evidence-based
programs” affect non-formal education praxis, showing in concrete terms what is at stake.
Purpose and Research Questions
The purpose of this study is to better understand how efforts to make non-formal
education more “evidence-based” actually unfold in practice. I focus specifically on three cases,
two of which involve mandates to implement evidence-based programs (i.e., tightly-scripted
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curricula that have been evaluated via an RCT), while the third involves incorporation of
evidence-based practices. The three cases are instances of a larger contextual shift towards more
“scientific” approaches to education research and evaluation, part of the “era of accountability.”
That shift has led to acrimonious debates in recent years. The positions espoused by participants
in those debates tend to fall into two general categories, suggesting that how questions about the
research-practice gap are posed is at least as important as how they are answered: Some
discussions treat the problem on a purely technical-rationalistic, instrumental level, focused on
improving the fidelity of implementation of evidence-based interventions (e.g., Meyers, Durlak
& Wandersman, 2012); Others foreground the normative and axiological nature of the problem,
offering theoretical critiques of the assumptions that undergird the very notion of the researchpractice gap (e.g., Biesta, 2007). Each of these approaches to posing and answering questions
about how to make education practices more evidence-based is elucidative, yet each is also
limiting. The first leaves too much unproblematized and risks reifying hegemonic relations of
knowledge and power in society; the second lacks grounding in practical contexts and risks
dissolving into polemical verbalism. The theoretical critiques characterizing this second category
must be supplemented by empirical studies rooted in the particular, historicized work processes
of individuals and organizations.
To that end, the study presented here analyzes what actually happens, in practice, when
people support the implementation of evidence-based programs or engage in related efforts to
make non-formal education more “evidence-based.” Like Timmermans and Berg (2003) in their
analysis of standardization in medical practice, instead of debating the advantages and
disadvantages of evidence-based approaches and getting stuck on a rhetorical level of analysis, I
offer a study of the politics of evidence in practice. I ask (1) How is evidence-based program and
evidence-based practice work actually practiced? (2) What perspectives and assumptions about
what non-formal education is are manifested through that work? and (3) What conflicts and
tensions emerge through that work related to those perspectives and assumptions? Empirically,
this qualitative study is based on data from in-depth interviews, observation, and document
analysis. Theoretically, it is informed by critical perspectives on epistemological politics,
drawing especially from the field of science and technology studies. By concentrating on the
details of practice, I elucidate some of the specific tensions and gaps inherent in that work,
calling the apparently self-evident superiority of evidence-based education into question.
Theoretical Framework
The evidence-based education movement, with its privileging of RCTs, contains and
relies on a number of often tacit assumptions about the nature of research, evidence, knowledge,
expertise, and social action, throwing the hierarchical division between “scientific” and
“everyday” ways of knowing into sharp relief. The very dichotomization of research and
practice, taken to be self-evident in many discussions of the gap between the two, establishes a
fundamental knowledge hierarchy in which the evidence-based movement is couched. The
theoretical framework guiding this study aims to problematize the tacit assumptions of the
evidence-based education movement, especially those related to the epistemological (and
ontological) politics of abstract knowledge hierarchies.
For instance, Biesta draws attention to the “epistemological, ontological and
praxeological dimensions of the discussion and in each domain identifies a deficit. In the
epistemological domain there is a knowledge deficit, in the ontological domain an effectiveness
or efficacy deficit and in the practice domain an application deficit” (2010, p. 491). In the
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epistemological domain, EBPs assume a representational epistemology, “in which true
knowledge is seen as an accurate representation of how ‘things’ are in ‘the world’” (Biesta,
2010, p. 494). In contrast, Biesta makes the case for a transactional epistemology, in which
“knowledge is not a depiction of a static world ‘out there’ … it is “knowledge about the world in
function of our interventions” (2010, p. 495). Heisenberg writes, “What we observe is not nature
itself, but nature exposed to our method of questioning” (quoted in Law & Urry, 2004, p. 395).
Biesta describes a “knowledge deficit” emerging from representational epistemology that relates
to our actual inability to know, through experimentation, that “what works” now, in one context,
will work in the future and in other contexts.
In the ontological domain, “talk about ‘what works’ … operates on the assumption of a
mechanistic ontology that is actually the exception, not the norm in the domain of human
interaction” (Biesta, 2010, p. 497). Finally, in the praxeological domain, Biesta builds on
Latour’s discussions of how techno-science succeeds and moves by rendering the world to be
more like the laboratory from which it originated (Latour, 1983). In a similar way, Leach,
Scoones, and Wynne (2005) explore how the application of scientific knowledge is performative
and transformative. It is “the tacit provisional performance of human ontologies in the making”
(Leach, Scoones, & Wynne, 2005, p. 13), what Law and Lien (2013) call the choreographies of
practice. As summarized by Mol and Berg (1998), “There are tensions among shaping practices,
bodies, and lives in various diverging ways: tensions between making the world run in this,
rather than some other way” (p. 7).
Another helpful theoretical lens is the notion of epistemic justice, which provides a
practical theoretical approach to uncovering, deconstructing, and working to replace unjust
knowledge hierarchies. Epistemic justice, sometimes referred to as cognitive justice, was
articulated first by scholars and activists (and activist-scholars) from the global South. In
essence, epistemic justice refers to “the constitutional right of different systems of knowledge to
exist as part of dialogue and debate” (Visvanathan, 2005, p. 92). Epistemic justice “has to do
with the coexistence of many knowledges in the world and the relation between the abstract
hierarchies which constitute them and the unequal economic and political power relations which
produce and reproduce increasingly more severe social injustice” (Toulmin, 2007, p. xv).
Evoking Scriven’s point about what is at stake in the RCT debates, Visvanathan writes, “One has
to realize that epistemology is not a remote, exotic term. It determines life chances” (2005, p.
84). The notion of epistemic justice, along with similar methodological perspectives derived
from science and technology studies, guides my analysis of the empirical cases presented below.
Methodology
Methodologically, the study was guided by science and technology studies (STS; e.g.,
Lindenbaum & Lock, 1993; Shapin & Schaffer, 1985). STS offers helpful perspectives because
of its focus on uncovering assumptions and problematizing seemingly self-evident categories and
norms. STS methods aim at determining “the processes by which certain forms of knowledge
achieve a moral legitimacy and appear to be part of the natural order” (Lindenbaum & Lock
1993, p. xiii). For instance, as pertains to the methodological and epistemological supremacy of
experimental designs, Shapin and Schaffer explicate the “historical circumstances in which
experiment as a systematic means of generating natural knowledge arose, in which experimental
practices became institutionalized, and in which experimentally produced matters of fact were
made into the foundations of what counted as proper scientific knowledge” (1985, p. 3).
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Sample: Three Focal Programs
All three focal programs in this study involve non-formal community-based education for
young adults. Two of the programs focus specifically on adolescent sexual health, while the third
is a more broadly focused positive youth development program. Of the two adolescent sexual
health programs, one takes place in the United States (Program A), while the other takes place in
Kenya (Program B). Both Programs A and B support the implementation of evidence-based
programs (EBPs) designed to prevent teenage pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases such
as HIV. They are both positioned between a funder and the community-based educational
organizations that implement specific EBPs supported (or mandated) by that funder. Both
programs offer training and technical assistance, provide guidance on evaluation, seek to
improve the fidelity of implementation of programs, and address other needs expressed by both
the funders and the community-based educators. The third, more general program (Program C)
takes place in the United States. All three programs have some relation to a university. Programs
A and C are both based in a center focused on translational research in the social and behavioral
sciences. As such, they are at the interface of research and practice. Program C is also part of the
Cooperative Extension System. Program B is a partnership of a U.S. university and a Kenyan
faith-based organization. These three programs were selected for inclusion in this study because
they are data rich—at the time the study was conducted, each of them was experiencing
increased pressure from various stakeholders to be more “evidence-based.” In other words, my
approach to sampling (at the level of organizations, programs, and people) was purposive,
directed at cases in which this study’s phenomena of interest were particularly salient.
Data Collection and Analysis
I collected qualitative data via semi-structured interviews, observation, and document
analysis. I interviewed thirty individuals (roughly ten per program). Interview questions were
designed to elicit both people’s stories of their work practices and people’s conceptualizations
and perceptions of key constructs such as evidence, the research-practice gap, and non-formal
education. The coming together of people’s stories of their work and people’s more abstract
conceptualization of their work ideally opens up space for tensions and gaps to emerge,
highlighting moments and places where seemingly universal constructs are actually enacted in a
multitude of disparate and even contradictory ways.
I observed over 100 hours of discrete events such as meetings, public lectures, plus many
additional hours of everyday work activities. Observation of the Kenyan program was limited
due to feasibility constraints, though I did observe a week-long meeting in Nairobi that focused
explicitly on the need for the program to be more “evidence-based,” which was a very data-rich
meeting. In addition to interviews and observation, I also collected textual data. Language and
other aspects of discourse are extremely important given the focus of this study (Wilson, 2009).
As such, my inclusion of textual data offered an additional level of insights and perspectives
about the phenomena of interest. The analysis of all three types of data was supported using a
computer assisted qualitative data software program, ATLAS.ti 7.0. I coded the data using a
blend of a priori codes (based on my research questions) and “emergent” codes.
Results: Making “Evidence-Based” Non-Formal Education
Each of the three focal cases presents its own nuances regarding the politics of evidence
in practice, yet taken together, certain trends emerge that have clear implications for non-formal
community education in general. Throughout, key issues include: adaptation of programs (e.g.,
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Who is allowed, as “expert knower” to adapt a program and who is not? How much adaptation is
allowed before another RCT should be conducted to retest the program’s effectiveness?),
cultural and local appropriateness of programs (e.g., How much external validity or
generalizability is expected for a program that has been proved to be effective via an RCT? What
elements of a curriculum that was developed and tested in the United States must be adapted to
“Kenyanize” it?), amenability of different phenomena, constructs, or (in this case) versions of
education to RCTs and EBPs (e.g., are certain types of education, such as tightly-scripted sexual
health lessons, more suitable to being tested via RCTs and packaged via EBPs, than other types
of education, such as holistic community development types of programs?). Building on this last
theme, I parsed people’s divergent perspectives and assumptions about the ontological status of
non-formal education into two modes (Table 1).
Table 1
Divergent Perspectives and Assumptions about What Non-Formal Education is
Mode 1
An infrastructure for the
dissemination of scientific
information

Mode 2

Program planning and
evaluation decisions are…

Campus- or scientist-driven

Community-driven

The essential unit of
educational interaction is…

A program
(meaning a tightly bounded and
scripted curriculum)

A set of practices and processes

Behavior change is assumed
to be…

Simple, or complicated; linear

Complex; non-linear

The focus is on…

Content delivery and
specific outcomes

Process facilitation and general
outcomes

Non-formal education is…

A site of grassroots
knowledge sharing

While this table presents an overly simplistic and falsely dichotomized characterization of the
two modes, it does offer a useful heuristic for the analysis of various contemporary approaches to
making community education more “evidence-based.”
Conclusions and Implications
Through my elucidation of the intricacies and contingencies involved in making nonformal education more “evidence-based,” I am able to highlight divergent perspectives and
assumptions about what non-formal education is and about how it should be informed by
research evidence. Specifically, non-formal education is constituted by some people as an
infrastructure for the dissemination of scientific information and by others as a grassroots site for
knowledge sharing. Relatedly, it is alternatively perceived and performed as a program (meaning
a tightly bounded, scripted curriculum) or as a set of practices. While the conflicts and tensions
between these divergent perspectives may appear academic or irrelevant, I argue that they have
stark implications for what non-formal education is and can be in society. Looking through the
lens of epistemic justice, I conclude that the self-evident superiority of evidence-based programs
must be revisited if we are to move towards an ethical praxis of non-formal education which
embraces rather than effaces the intricacies and nuances that characterize social human action.
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